Syria's rebel leaders say they've broken with their jihadist past - can they be trusted?

Last week, while touring Damascus, Syria's new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) was approached by a young woman who asked for a photo with him. He gently requested that she cover her hair before taking the picture.

The incident quickly sparked heated debate across Arabic social and mainstream media.

What happened may have been small but it was telling because it encapsulated the tightrope that Syria's new rulers Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) - who are designated as a terrorist organisation by the UN, US, EU and UK - must walk.

On one side is the diverse, and, in some cases more liberal, Syrian population, along with the international community, whose acceptance is crucial for HTS's survival and legitimacy. To them, the hair covering incident offered a troubling glimpse into Syria's potential future under HTS, expressing fears that conservative policies could eventually mandate the veil for all women.

On the other side, Islamist hardliners criticised al-Sharaa for taking the photo at all, describing the woman as a "mutabarijah" - a term for a woman perceived to dress immodestly or wear makeup – and insisting his action violated religious rules.

These hardliners hold significant sway over militant factions and could rally opposition within al-Sharaa's own Islamist base.

HTS faces the challenge of attempting to reconcile these competing demands - balancing the expectations of the international community and the liberal parts of Syria's population with the demands of the hardline base. Both sides are closely scrutinising HTS's every statement and action.

The group's ability to navigate these tensions will be critical to maintaining control and pursuing its political ambitions.

In his messages, he has focused on coexistence within Syria's diverse society, granted amnesty to former military conscripts, prohibited acts of vigilante revenge against ex-government personnel and loyalists, and adopted neutral and at times conciliatory language when addressing traditional adversaries, including Israel, the US, Iran, and Russia.

His statements have been deliberately devoid of inflammatory rhetoric or threats, instead centring on themes of reconciliation, stability, and reconstruction, in a clear effort to neutralise opposition and push for the removal of HTS and al-Sharaa himself from international terror lists.

It is still unclear whether al-Sharaa's flexible approach represents a genuine ideological shift or a calculated strategy aimed at winning approval and consolidating power before potentially implementing a stricter and more religiously conservative agenda.

But already his more progressive moves are sparking significant unease among hardliners in Syria, who insist on an Islamist government rooted in a strict and distinctive Sunni identity. While Sunni Arabs are the dominant ethnic and religious group in Syria, the country is notably diverse, with a range of minority groups including Shia Alawites, of which the ousted president Bashar al-Assad is a member, Kurds, Christians, Druze, Turkmen, and Ismailis, in addition to other small groups.

Even if HTS leadership is sincere in its push for change, the diverse range of Islamist and jihadist factions deeply entrenched in Syria - many of which played key roles in the recent offensive - are unlikely to tolerate anything short of a strict Islamist system. Should HTS deviate from such a path, these factions would likely be prepared to resort to armed resistance to enforce their vision.

However this is not a new challenge for HTS.

For a decade the group, formerly known as al-Nusra Front and with roots in transnational jihadist movements, has been evolving.

HTS transitioned from being a covert offshoot of the ultra-hardline IS around 2011 and 2012, to being affiliated to the relatively more flexible al-Qaeda the following year, and by 2016 to an independent faction.

It consolidated its control of Idlib province in north-west Syria in 2017, running a civilian "government" in the area purportedly with no lasting jihadist connections or ambitions.

This evolution reflects al-Sharaa's strategic vision and likely incorporates elements of opportunism and pragmatism aimed at ensuring the group's acceptance and long-term survival. HTS's strategy of signalling that it poses no external threat has already borne fruit.

While its former jihadist partners, al-Qaeda and IS, were heavily targeted in Syria by the US-led coalition - resulting in the routine assassination of their leaders, often in Idlib itself - al-Sharaa has operated with relative freedom.

Despite a $10 million (£7.8m) US bounty on his head, he has been able to frequently appear publicly, attending events and engaging with the population, much like a statesman.

However, al-Sharaa's jihadist critics accuse him of being a manipulative politician, willing to compromise on key ideological principles to advance his own career and secure political gains for HTS, at the expense of other militant groups operating in the country.

HTS solidified its authority in Idlib through a dual strategy: winning the hearts and minds of local populations through offering some form of stability, while using force to stamp out or co-opt rivals and even former allies.

The group moved away from distinctive jihadist rhetoric, fighting for religion, and the establishment of Islamic rule (Sharia) in Syria, as part of a wider interconnected global project. Instead, they adopted a more "revolutionary" and nationalist narrative, focusing on the singular goal of toppling Syria's president Bashar al-Assad and "liberating" Syria.

The civilian front established by HTS in 2017 to administer Idlib was called the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). The aim was to demonstrate HTS's governance capabilities, and bolster its legitimacy. This move was likely also aimed at alleviating fears about militants running a province, seeking to distance itself from the brutal image associated with IS's rule over territories in Syria and Iraq.

The SSG operated as a mini-state, complete with a prime minister, ministries, and local departments managing key sectors such as education, health, and reconstruction, all while adhering to a religious council guided by Sharia (Islamic law). It also established professional-looking military and police academies, frequently showcasing their graduation ceremonies and organising military parades, typically attended by al-Sharaa.

The SSG frequently showcased its achievements in reconstruction and service provision. It often contrasted these efforts with the dire conditions and rampant corruption in areas controlled by the Syrian government or rival rebel groups. Al-Sharaa even twice attended Idlib's annual book fair, giving speeches.

But HTS faced significant challenges in Idlib, and its rule was far from smooth.

Prior to the 27 November HTS-led rebel offensive, the group was dogged by anti-HTS protests, particularly targeting al-Sharaa's leadership. Protesters accused HTS of suppressing dissent through forced disappearances and imprisonment of opponents and critics.

The group also faced criticism for allegedly colluding with foreign powers to undermine "the jihad" in Syria. In 2023, it was further rocked by a scandal involving spies within its top leadership, and was accused by hardliners of deliberately avoiding meaningful combat against government forces to please unnamed foreign backers.

During such protests, al-Sharaa was frequently likened to Assad, while HTS's security apparatus was compared to the "Shabiha", Assad's notorious loyalist militia.

However, it is important to note that many of HTS's critics, past and present, and some of the those imprisoned by the group, were hardliners actively inciting opposition to HTS's project in Idlib. Others were locals and activists who criticised what they described as HTS's monopolisation of power and "authoritarian" rule.

Although some locals have voiced complaints about religious restrictions in Idlib, as reported by Arab media and NGOs, these grievances have not been widespread. This may be due to HTS's relative flexibility and the fact that most residents of the province are conservative Sunni Muslims who may be generally accepting of the status quo.

Indeed, HTS has often come in for harsh criticism by hardliners for being too "lenient" and failing to impose strict Sharia rules in Idlib.

Al-Sharaa has argued that the imposition of strict rules such as the morality police is an outdated idea that often causes more harm than good. In April 2023 he said: "We don't want to create a hypocritical society that prays when we're around and doesn't when we're gone." He emphasised that he wanted people to adhere to Islamic teachings out of conviction, "not through the stick [force]."

Despite these comments, the group has often responded by employing strict measures in a clear effort to appease hardliners – a pattern that offers insight into how HTS may respond to such pressures in future.

For example, despite dissolving various Hisba (morality police) structures that operated under thinly-veiled names and despite the vocal objections of al-Sharaa himself, the SSG nevertheless established a "public morality police" under its Ministry of Interior in early 2024.

These morality forces regulated shops, ensured women wore compliant religious clothing and limited the mixing of sexes in public spaces.

And a few months earlier, the SSG's Ministry of Education had issued a decree mandating that all female students and staff wear "loose Islamic dress that complies with Sharia", which includes covering one's hair and avoiding "fashion and trends" deemed "incompatible with our religious teachings". The decree also prohibited the mixing of sexes in primary and secondary schools.

Until recently, the dominant feature of Syria's opposition groups - whether rebel or jihadist - was disunity and fragmentation, often marked by bouts of infighting. Armed factions competed over territory, revenue sources, authority, and ideology.

For years, this persistent disunity, among other factors, severely hampered their ability to achieve victory over Assad.

The recent rebel unity that led to Assad's downfall remains a relatively new development and could still prove fragile. Also, there are internal challenges still posed by rival factions.

HTS has long had a strained relationship with the other major rebel bloc in Syria, the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The SNA's focus during the recent offensive has largely aligned with Ankara's priorities - seizing Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria to eliminate what Turkey perceives as a Kurdish "threat" along its borders.

Whether the two blocs can agree on the division of the strategic locations seized from Kurdish forces - or across Syria more broadly - remains uncertain, particularly as HTS continues to push for complete unity, clearly under its own leadership.

IS, which remains active in Syria through both operatives and sleeper cells, has declared its ongoing jihad in the country and denounced the HTS-led rebel authority as "apostates" allegedly brought to power by "infidel" forces.

With the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) weakening in the northeast, IS is likely to set its sights on the prisons and camps in Hasaka that hold IS-linked fighters and their families. A mass release or escape from these facilities could significantly bolster IS's ranks and ability to destabilise Syria.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 - and Assad's brutal crackdown on the uprising - the country has attracted a wide range of foreign fighters, clerics and transnational jihadist groups, facilitated by porous borders, particularly via Turkey.

To consolidate its control over Idlib, and possibly as part of deals with foreign powers to contain the jihadist threat in northern Syria, HTS crushed some local and foreign factions and co-opted others, integrating them into its own structures, renaming their units to obscure their foreign origins. These include smaller factions from Central Asia, the Caucasus (Chechens) and China's Uighur minority.

Many of these smaller factions, including independent jihadist groups like Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Tawhid, actively participated in the latest offensive, which highlights their potential vested interest in shaping the future of the new Syria.

In terms of post-Assad messaging, groups like al-Qaeda as well as more moderate Islamist figures and scholars have reminded HTS about its "obligation" to ensure the set-up of an Islamic system in Syria, distinguished by a strong Sunni identity.

When asked by a CNN correspondent on 6 December whether HTS intends to impose an Islamic system, al-Sharaa gave a characteristically evasive response. Instead of a direct "yes" or "no", he stated, "People who fear Islamic governance either have seen incorrect implementations of it or do not understand it properly."

This carefully worded answer suggest that HTS likely plans to implement Islamic governance, but perhaps in a more flexible and nuanced form.

But already since HTS toppled the Assad government, ideological tensions have begun to resurface after the initial euphoria and unified effort to achieve a common goal. On 9 December HTS issued a decree granting amnesty to former military conscripts, but hardliners in Syria denounced the move as overly "lenient" and inconsistent with Sharia law, going so far as to incite disobedience and call for revenge attacks against ex-government loyalists, directly defying the HTS order.

HTS attempted to quell the uproar by issuing a statement clarifying that it would pursue former government personnel and loyalists implicated in war crimes - an apparent attempt to appease critics. At the same time, HTS sought to reinforce its authority, explicitly vowing to punish anyone who defied its decree by engaging in vigilante revenge.

Another point of contention arose on 16 December when al-Sharaa announced plans to disband and disarm militant groups and militias in the country, concentrating weapons in the hands of the state and the military alone.

Again, hardliners protested, urging factions to retain their arms. They argued the move would consolidate power under HTS, leaving no other groups armed to challenge its authority and paving the way for tyranny.

Further discontent emerged over HTS's muted response to repeated Israeli airstrikes in Syria following Assad's fall. After days of silence, on 14 December al-Sharaa criticised the strikes but stated that his group had no intention of engaging in any new conflicts, emphasising its current focus on rebuilding Syria. He also stated that he will not allow Syria to be used as a launchpad for attacks against Israel.

Some viewed this stance as weak and a betrayal of Islamist principles. Their frustration was amplified by al-Qaeda's recent message urging HTS to prioritise the fight against Israel and fulfil its "obligation" to defend Palestinians in Gaza.

These tensions suggest that hardliners - both within HTS ranks and external factions - may be willing to take up arms against the group if they perceive it as straying too far from their vision for a new religious Syria.

Many of these individuals and factions are deeply invested in the country and are unlikely to relinquish their ambitions easily. They view Syria, much like Afghanistan under the Taliban, as a project for a strong Sunni Islamic state - one that could wield regional influence while serving as a safe haven for persecuted Muslims and jihadist fugitives.

Under pressure from liberals and hardliners alike, al-Sharaa and HTS are treading a fine line in an attempt not to antagonise either side too much and the need for flexibility appears to be key.

A week ago the young woman wanting a photo was asked to cover her hair.

This week al-Sharaa was photographed with two British diplomats, one of whom was Ann Snow, the UK's special representative for Syria. Her hair was uncovered.

Top image credit: Getty