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The Taliban’s minister of refugees, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, was killed along with four others in a suicide attack in Kabul on Wednesday.
The deceased minister was a senior leader within the Haqqani Network, the Taliban’s closest ally which has jointly controlled power in Afghanistan since 2021.
Haqqani’s killing was claimed by the ISIL (ISIS)-affiliate in the Khorasan Province, ISKP, and marks the most significant assassination of a leader in Afghanistan’s Taliban-led administration since the ouster of the United States-backed government of former President Ashraf Ghani three years ago, say analysts.
The bombing, they say, has raised questions about internal tensions within the Taliban and its allies, the influence of the ISKP in the country and security in Afghanistan more broadly.
Who was Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani?
Haqqani was the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s interior minister and the senior-most leader of the Haqqani Network.
Before being appointed as the minister for refugees, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani was first charged with the security of Kabul city immediately after the Taliban seized control of the country. He was previously the Haqqani Network’s operational commander aiding al-Qaeda’s military in Afghanistan, and was crucial to his network’s fundraising efforts.
In 2011, the US Treasury Department designated him a “terrorist”, with a reward of up to $5m for information leading to his capture and prosecution.
“He was incredibly significant,” said Ashley Jackson, the co-director at the Geneva-headquartered Centre on Armed Groups, adding that he was “instrumental in the creation of the Haqqani Network”.
“Moreover, he had a strong power base … within the government. We saw him early in the administration making moves to exert authority over UN agencies, and he was fairly autonomous and did his own thing basically,” added Jackson.
Indeed, Haqqani’s appointment to the ministry raised eyebrows among Western officials in 2021, said Graeme Smith, a senior consultant with the International Crisis Group. “They remembered him as a tough commander during the war and they worried that the refugee ministry would require a softer kind of personality who works well with NGOs,” he said.
But inside the government, Smith added, Haqqani became known as a pragmatist. “He was reputed to be lobbying behind the scenes for girls and women to attend secondary schools and universities,” he said.
While the Taliban has imposed a number of restrictions on women’s freedoms since taking over, there has been a degree of internal resistance, largely coming from the Haqqani leadership, towards the complete ban on women’s higher education in Afghanistan, say analysts.
“He was a formidable figure within the Haqqani Network. And the loss of a member with [a] ministerial position would diminish Haqqani’s power,” Jackson said.
Is the Taliban-led administration divided?
While the attack was quickly claimed by the ISKP, the stature and nature of the target have sparked speculation over whether the assassination was the result of an internal tussle within the Taliban-led administration in Afghanistan.
An attack targeting a senior member of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network would have required a degree of planning and, possibly, infiltration, Jackson said.
“One cannot just simply walk up to someone like Khalil Haqqani and do this. He was a man who was — by all reports — heavily armed himself and surrounded by people who are heavily armed. And I would think it was very unlikely that he would let strangers in close physical proximity,” she pointed out.
Ibraheem Bahiss, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, suggested that the timing of the attack, which came at a time of rumoured divisions within the leadership over the increasing restrictions on women, has fuelled speculation of infighting within the Taliban.
There are many different power bases within the Taliban-led administration, Jackson agreed, and the Haqqanis, she said, “are the most powerful faction with differences of opinion” over some decisions taken by Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, she said, has in speeches signalled disagreements — albeit respectfully — on issues such as the “forceful implementation of some edicts in the southeast regions where the Haqqanis hold sway”.
But the Taliban has dismissed talk of fissures. Senior Taliban leaders, including Abdul Ghani Baradar, who is the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, attended Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani’s funeral, where he spoke of “love and friendship” among the movement’s leaders. He reportedly asked followers not to give credence to talks of a split within the administration.
And even if some differences exist, security analysts say they are not significant enough to result in open violence between factions.
“Disputes are normal inside of any administration and the political disagreements among Taliban leaders are well-known,” said Smith. “But no significant battles have occurred between major Taliban figures over the last three years.”
Jackson agreed.
“I don’t think these divides at this point are wide enough to trigger violent conflict. There’s no indication that the Taliban is divided enough to turn on itself,” she said.
In fact, she said, the Taliban continue to present a united front for the most part. “There is this ethos of obedience to the emir within their movement, which has so far prevented splits and divides from opening up into violent conflict,” she pointed out, referring to Akhunzada.
Is ISKP’s influence expanding?
However, if the ISKP is responsible for Haqqani’s assassination, this would suggest that the ISIL (ISIS) faction — despite a major Taliban crackdown on it — remains a potent force and serious security threat to Afghanistan and the region.
“This is the most high-profile assassination in a long time that we’ve seen and really suggests that if you can get to someone like Khalil Haqqani, there are serious problems in your security,” Jackson said.
A UN monitoring report in July estimated that the ISKP’s presence in Afghanistan “has increased from 4,000 to 6,000 fighters, despite the loss of territory and attrition among leadership”.
Analysts say, however, that the ISKP’s attacks have trended downward over the last three years. “The Taliban struggled to contain the group during the first months after August 2021, and then a series of well-targeted operations against ISKP leaders constrained them. Violence levels have been dropping,” said Smith.
The assassination “has to be viewed in the context of ISKP’s fight for survival against the Taliban’s powerful security apparatus,” he added.
Bahiss, however, argued that amid “serious setbacks”, the ISKP has become “a lot more strategic”.
“They’ve generally tried to either target foreign interests such as embassies, hotels and tourists, or they have gone after senior Taliban leaders and ideologues, or they’ve continued to target Hazara civilians,” he said, referring to the persecuted ethnic Afghan minority.
Meanwhile, the ISKP’s international footprint and threat capacity have increased, Bahiss said. The group claimed responsibility for an attack on a Moscow concert hall in March in which more than 130 people were killed.
“So, even though they might be struggling in Afghanistan, they have become a lot more dangerous from an international perspective. And killing senior Taliban leaders ensures that they remain relevant as a political actor even inside Afghanistan,” he added.
The UN report in July also noted that the ISKP had “improved its financial and logistical capabilities and intensified recruitment efforts”. The ISKP has also been known to recruit from within the Taliban’s own ranks.
Bahiss suggested this attack was likely due to a gap in the Taliban security measures, exploited by the ISKP.
“The idea that ISKP will completely disappear from Afghanistan – I think it’s unlikely. It’s a generational challenge that the Taliban will continue to face,” he said.
