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This month, three high-level visits within the space of six days showed how the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria is increasingly shaping the policies of European governments in the Maghreb.
On July 15 and 16, French Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu led a large ministerial delegation to Morocco, consolidating the rapid rapprochement between Paris and Rabat. At almost the same time, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was in Berlin seeking to deepen Algeria’s partnership with Germany. Four days later, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez arrived in Algiers, continuing efforts to repair relations strained by Madrid’s shift towards Morocco.
The principal fault line in the rivalry is Western Sahara. Morocco controls most of the territory and has made support for its sovereignty claim, or its autonomy proposal, a central test of its foreign partnerships. Algiers backs the Polisario Front’s demand for independence and has responded sharply when European governments endorse Rabat’s position on the territory.
Both countries possess significant leverage. Morocco offers intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation, help in managing migration, investment opportunities and access to its economic networks in Africa. Algeria has major natural gas reserves, a substantial domestic market and considerable influence over security and diplomacy in the Maghreb and the Sahel.
European governments cannot therefore manage the two relationships in isolation. Decisions that strengthen ties with one can reshape their diplomatic, economic and security cooperation with the other.
France provides the clearest example.
In 2024, President Emmanuel Macron backed Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and described Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the basis for resolving the conflict. The decision helped end a prolonged period of tension between Paris and Rabat, but triggered an immediate crisis with Algeria, which recalled its ambassador.
Lecornu’s visit showed that France does not regard its 2024 shift as a limited diplomatic concession. It is building a wider strategic partnership with Morocco around it.
The two governments advanced cooperation on energy, investment, security, migration, education and infrastructure. They also discussed a direct electricity link that could bring renewable energy from Morocco to France and continued preparations for a future bilateral treaty.
For France, Morocco offers a relatively stable partner at a time when French influence has declined across much of the Sahel. Several governments in the region have expelled French troops, downgraded relations with Paris or sought alternative security partners. Morocco, by contrast, has expanded its economic and diplomatic presence in West Africa through banking, telecommunications, construction and religious and security cooperation.
Rabat therefore offers Paris a means of preserving influence in Africa while developing new commercial, energy and security projects. In return, Morocco gains investment, diplomatic prestige and further international support for its position on Western Sahara.
The depth of France’s commitment is perhaps clearest in what Paris appears prepared to overlook.
As Lecornu visited Morocco, new reporting reinforced allegations that Moroccan intelligence had used the Israeli-made Pegasus spyware against senior French officials, including Lecornu while he was serving in government as minister of local authorities. Morocco has repeatedly denied acquiring or using Pegasus.
The allegations did not disrupt the visit. The two governments publicly celebrated their security cooperation and continued preparing a broader strategic partnership, demonstrating the importance Paris now attaches to its relationship with Rabat.
This choice has carried costs.
France’s relations with Algeria were already burdened by disputes over colonial history, migration and security. Macron’s Western Sahara decision deepened those recurring tensions into a broader strategic rupture.
Security cooperation stalled, French companies faced growing obstacles and French wheat was largely excluded from Algerian import tenders. Paris and Algiers have since cautiously reopened dialogue, but France has shown no willingness to reverse the policy that caused the crisis.
Algeria did not force France to change its position. But it demonstrated that alignment with Morocco could reshape France’s economic, diplomatic and security relationship with Algeria.
Spain encountered the same pressure after making a similar choice.
In 2022, Sanchez’s government abandoned Spain’s previous neutrality and described Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the most serious, realistic and credible basis for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. The decision helped Madrid repair a damaging dispute with Rabat, but provoked an immediate backlash from Algeria.
Algiers recalled its ambassador, suspended its two-decade friendship treaty with Spain and halted most non-gas trade. Spanish exports to Algeria collapsed, although Algeria continued honouring its gas contracts.
Once again, Algeria could not compel a Western government to reverse its policy. But it could force that government to adjust its wider regional diplomacy.
Spain has since tried to repair relations with Algeria without sacrificing its renewed partnership with Morocco. Sanchez’s July 20 visit to Algiers marked the clearest sign yet of this recalibration. The two governments agreed to revive high-level bilateral mechanisms and deepen cooperation on energy, investment, migration and security.
The challenge for Madrid is that both relationships are essential. Algeria remains a major gas supplier, while Morocco is crucial to Spanish trade, counterterrorism and migration policy.
Madrid also remembers the 2021 Ceuta crisis, when Morocco appeared to relax border controls during a diplomatic dispute, allowing thousands of people to enter the Spanish enclave.
The breakdown with Algeria, meanwhile, damaged trade and complicated energy diplomacy. Sanchez is therefore attempting a difficult balancing act: preserving Spain’s rapprochement with Morocco while rebuilding the cooperation with Algeria that this rapprochement severely damaged.
Tebboune’s simultaneous visit to Berlin illustrated Algeria’s efforts to widen its European partnerships.
Germany and Algeria discussed deeper cooperation on energy, investment, industry, migration and security, including the potential including the potential export of Maghrebi hydrogen to Europe.
The German-Algerian relationship has its own economic and strategic foundations and cannot be reduced to the rivalry with Morocco. But closer ties with Berlin broaden Algeria’s European options beyond France.
Morocco and Algeria are no longer merely competing for Western support. Through energy, migration, security cooperation, market access and regional influence, they are increasingly shaping how European governments organise their relationships across the Maghreb.
France has made Morocco a central pillar of its regional strategy. Spain is rebuilding ties with Algeria without abandoning its rapprochement with Rabat. Algeria is widening its European partnerships as France moves closer to Morocco. The rivalry has not divided Europe into permanent blocs, but Morocco and Algeria have become increasingly effective at making European governments organise their North African policies around it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
