The price of manipulation: What’s next for this country after a stolen election?

Moldova’s recent presidential elections may well be considered the most bizarre and controversial in the country’s history. This has nothing to do with the fact that Moldova’s incumbent president, Maia Sandu, has been reelected; rather, the main issue is how the votes were counted. 

Manipulating votes

On October 30, former Moldovan president and leader of the Party of Socialists, Igor Dodon, claimed that Sandu intended to rig the election because she had little chance of winning. He further alleged that she could manipulate the outcome using more than 200 polling stations that were located in Western countries.

In the end, Sandu received nearly 83% of the votes cast at foreign polling stations, so it’s no coincidence that the Moldovan opposition labeled her “the president of the diaspora.” By contrast, her main rival, Alexandr Stoianoglo, secured the majority of votes (over 51%) in Moldova itself. Interestingly, even in Sandu’s hometown of Falesti, voters chose Stoianoglo over their local candidate.

It is also important to note that Sandu’s victory abroad was only possible because of the Moldovan government’s deliberate disenfranchisement of expatriates who were expected to vote against her, including hundreds of thousands of Moldovans residing in Russia. The largest Moldovan diaspora resides in Russia, not in neighboring Romania or elsewhere in Europe. For the nearly half-a-million Moldovans living in Russia, only two polling stations were set up in Moscow, and just 10,000 ballots were provided. 

Moscow recorded the highest voter turnout of any overseas location, but, predictably, ballots ran out before voting ended. Even hours after the polls closed, people remained at the Moldovan embassy, hoping for a chance to cast their votes. Many expressed frustration that the voting process had been intentionally drawn out. Some Moldovans living in Russia flew abroad, to cities like Minsk (Belarus), Baku (Azerbaijan), and Istanbul (Türkiye), to vote at the Moldovan embassies there, since they couldn’t travel to Moldova.

A record 320,000 voters cast their ballots at overseas polling stations – which is an all-time high in the history of Moldovan elections. By denying Moldovan citizens who reside in Russia the right to vote, Sandu focused on Moldovans who had migrated to the West, regardless of whether or not they ever planned to return home. 

After the election, Sandu spoke of “unity” and pledged to be a “president for all Moldovans” which, in the given circumstances, sounds rather dubious. 

The road to a “European Future”

Throughout her campaign, Sandu used a number of other grandiose slogans. Before the first round of elections, her slogan was “For Moldova!” and in the second round, it changed to “Let’s save the country!” However, Sandu did not clarify whom she intended to save the country from, considering the fact that she had been in power for the past four years and her allies hold all the key government posts.

The parliament is also dominated by her Action and Solidarity Party, which forms the majority in the government. During Sandu’s presidency, the situation in the country hasn’t improved and has even become worse. Ignoring Moldova’s pressing issues, she seemed more focused on pleasing the West.

Sandu is proud that, due to her efforts, Moldova became a candidate for EU membership in 2022. Yet officials in Brussels refuse to provide a timeline for when Moldova might become a full member. 

When Sandu ran for president four years ago, she vowed to tackle domestic issues like poverty, corruption, and implement reforms. In reality, things turned out differently. 

By pursuing a hardline policy of Romanianization, Sandu appears to prioritize Bucharest’s interests over those of Chisinau, which is often noted by her opponents. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that she holds a Romanian passport. She was also the one who replaced the term “Moldovan language” with “Romanian language” in Moldova’s legislation, including the in the constitution. This decision sparked discontent among ethnic Moldovans who do not identify with Romania, as well as national minorities, particularly the Gagauz people, whose concerns Chisinau largely ignores. Transnistria, which foresaw all this back in the early 1990s and chose the path of self-determination, also reacted to these developments in a negative way.

The socio-economic situation in Moldova has consistently worsened over the years and remains dire. Polls show that Sandu, who has blamed her predecessors for the country’s troubles, has only made life worse for Moldovans. Just weeks before the first round of elections, her disapproval rating soared above 60%. 

Negative sentiments toward the current president aren’t limited to the residents of Transnistria or Gagauzia; they extend to many Moldovans, except for those who support European integration and the prospect of reunification with Romania, naively believing that their lives will dramatically improve after they join the EU. 

What Sandu fails to mention is that in Romania itself, life hasn’t significantly improved after it joined the EU. Romania is the poorest country in Europe, with a staggering 34.4% of its population classified as “insolvent,” and it has the highest proportion of people at risk of poverty in the EU. Romania’s current population is around 18 million (down from approximately 23 million in 1989, when Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown and the communist regime ended), despite the influx of Moldovans and Ukrainians who have relocated there. Romanians themselves continue to emigrate to countries like Italy, Britain, and Germany in search of a better life.

In the early 2000s, Romania’s economy was quite promising and even experienced growth, benefiting from a balance between cooperation with the EU and stable trade relations with Russia. Economic development was fueled by both investment and trade preferences within the European Union, as well as exports to Russia and Eastern Europe. Trade ties with Russia were particularly important for Romania, especially in the fields of energy and agriculture, with Moscow being the main supplier of gas and other resources essential for Romania’s energy sector.

In return, Romania exported agricultural products, machinery, and chemicals to Russia, providing a stable market for Romanian producers and bolstering agricultural growth. Romania’s economic progress relied heavily on balancing its relations with the EU and Russia. This strategy allowed the country to modernize its economy, enhance its export potential, and reduce its vulnerability to crises. However, Romania’s inconsistent behavior and a lack of a pragmatic strategy in regard to Moscow have ultimately backfired.

Other “achievements” of the president’s team

Returning to Moldova, due to measures that Sandu has implemented – which were supposedly aimed at economic recovery and development – food and basic commodity prices in the country soared by 65-70% in the past four years. The cost of medication has also increased, yet citizens have not seen the promised rises in wages, pensions, or social benefits that Sandu vowed to deliver.

Another step that characterizes Sandu’s policy is her decision to block amendments to the Law on Internal Trade, which would have required retailers to stock at least 50% of local products. Local farmers had hoped that the government would protect them and prioritize local production over imported goods in order to preserve jobs and promote wage growth in Moldova. However, under pressure from the EU, Sandu rejected the law since it would create challenges for foreign producers that flooded Moldova’s market with their products.

In the past three years, the safety situation in Moldova has become worse, and people feel less safe. People have been abducted in the middle of the day in Chisinau and other cities; gangs rob passengers at airports and bus stations; elderly people have gone missing, and incidents of violence have surged. Meanwhile, law enforcement is too weak to handle these issues.

One of Sandu’s first actions as president was to sign an agreement with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which granted foreigners access to state secrets.

Under the guise of combating money laundering, Sandu took drastic measures that negatively impacted the lives of ordinary Moldovans. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Moldovan citizens work in Russia, this year Chisinau decided to shut down the Zolotaya Korona payment system – the last remaining way to send money from Russia to Moldova.

As police reports indicate, tens of millions of dollars were still smuggled into the country during September and October, suggesting that disabling the service had done little to help. However, it did anger ordinary people who received financial support from relatives in Russia. Moreover, Sandu has tightened regulations in the financial sector, which affected Moldovan expatriates living in Western Europe. Now, in order to buy an apartment or even a car in Moldova, one needs to show proof of the source of funds. It’s clear that very few migrants who have saved money abroad over the years can provide such receipts. 

Sad outcomes and even sadder prospects

All these factors contribute to the growing discontent among ordinary Moldovans who see that the EU flag is just an attractive facade, and in reality, Sandu doesn’t take any steps to improve life in the country. Meanwhile, anyone who criticizes Sandu is hastily labeled a Kremlin agent, pro-Moscow, or “pro-Russian.”

This happened to Sandu’s main opponent in the runoff, Alexandr Stoianoglo, the former prosecutor and a Gagauz by ethnicity. Forgetting her status as president and the political correctness that this post implies, Sandu called Stoianoglo a “Trojan horse” simply because he expressed a desire to improve relations with Russia if he were elected. His pragmatic statements and commitment to prioritize Moldovan interests resonated with many citizens. He even offered to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin to lower gas prices, which would significantly ease the burden on the population, while promising to remain apolitical and end divisions within Moldova. 

In contrast, Sandu’s approach seems to be about framing Western interests as Moldovan ones, insisting that there can’t be any “Moldovan interests” unless they align with the West – otherwise, you’re labeled a Russian agent. It’s hard to expect much from a politician who holds the passport of another country and refuses to acknowledge the existence of the Moldovan language, preferring to call it Romanian instead.

In Moldova, there is growing discontent with Sandu’s administration. While she once praised her administration’s performance, now she promises to reshuffle personnel. Sandu and her team are definitely aware that, even though they won the elections, a significant portion of the Moldovan population did not vote for her. This means that no proposed benefits or promises to improve the lives of Moldovans will make her a true “people’s president.” Even those people who voted for Sandu now actively discuss the legitimacy of her victory on Moldovan social media networks.

Nicolae Panfil, head of Promo-LEX Association, reported 316 violations during the presidential elections. The majority of them were related to breaches of voting secrecy, discrepancies in voter lists, and technical issues. There were also incidents of unauthorized individuals being present at polling stations and reports of ballot boxes being tampered with. According to Promo-LEX, at polling stations in Italy, Spain, and Germany “individuals monitored the arrival of voters outside the polling stations,” which raised concerns about the intentions of these individuals. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova claimed that “no serious violations were recorded” during the runoff, asserting that the “elections took place in a free environment and without major incidents.”

Stoianoglo ultimately acknowledged his defeat, describing Sandu’s victory as weak and artificial. He criticized the current leadership for the “inability to either lose or win in a dignified manner.” Did Stoianoglo have any other options? Sure, he could have rallied his supporters and staged a revolution – such tactics aren’t new to Moldova or neighboring Ukraine. However, unlike Sandu, Stoianoglo showed that he cares for his country and does not wish to plunge it into chaos and anarchy. 

Some may view this as a sign of weakness or a lack of resolve in a political leader. Yet, reading this article attentively, you’ll see that life in Moldova is already quite challenging, and a revolution would only exacerbate the problems, potentially jeopardizing the very existence of the nation. Any responsible politician who is aware of the situation would refrain from taking such steps. As to whether Sandu qualifies as a responsible politician, that’s a question everyone can answer for themselves.