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By Maxim Medvedkov, an adviser to the Centre of Expertise on WTO Issues and former chief negotiator for Russia’s accession to the WTO
The future of global trade and the impact of US President Donald Trump’s latest tariff initiatives will largely depend on Washington’s ultimate objective. Is the United States preparing to leave the World Trade Organization (WTO), or is it trying to force long-overdue reforms upon an organization it has increasingly sidelined?
By imposing sweeping new tariffs, the US has not only blatantly violated its WTO commitments but has also signaled that it no longer feels bound by international trade law. Moreover, Washington has shown no intention of invoking the WTO’s existing mechanisms for handling emergency tariff hikes. This overlooked point is crucial: either America returns to playing by the rules, or it continues down a path where trade is governed by unilateral concepts, not multilateral law. The very future of US participation in the WTO hinges on this decision.
The WTO has two tools to enforce compliance: moral pressure and retaliatory measures. Moral pressure may work on smaller nations, but it’s ineffective against the seasoned negotiators of the world’s largest economy. Retaliation, meanwhile, is a slow process. Under WTO rules, it can only occur after a dispute has been adjudicated, a ruling issued, and damages quantified. This takes up to two years. But with the WTO Appellate Body paralyzed – thanks to a US blockade – such resolutions are currently impossible. Any countermeasures taken by other countries would themselves be WTO violations. The institution was simply not designed for such breakdowns.
While the WTO cannot expel the United States, it can consider alternative arrangements to preserve its multilateral functions without American participation. These are not simple, but they are feasible. Many members would even welcome a US exit. In recent years, Washington has not only ceased leading the organization but has actively disrupted it.
Still, the US is not formally withdrawing, and some of its reform proposals deserve attention. For instance, it has suggested recalibrating the special treatment given to developing countries, pointing out that several of them are now major global economic players. Washington also advocates stricter discipline on members that fail to file timely notifications about their trade policies and subsidies. Its proposal to bar such “delinquent” countries from meetings and increase their dues met fierce resistance from WTO bureaucracies – a reaction that may have only fueled America’s turn to tariffs.
The threat of a “WTO minus the US” is a pressure tool in itself. But the US still derives over 40% of its corporate profits from overseas, and abandoning all influence over global trade rules hardly suits its strategic interests. Yet creating an effective alternative path requires unprecedented coordination among WTO members – something the current leadership vacuum makes difficult. The EU lacks the resolve, China is not yet ready, and collective leadership among like-minded countries is proving inefficient.
The most likely outcome will be a series of reciprocal deals. Smaller economies reliant on US markets may offer tailored concessions. Nations like Switzerland and Singapore, which already operate with minimal tariffs, could adjust more easily. Non-tariff barriers are typically easier to revise, provided they don’t conceal protectionism.
For major economies such as the EU or Japan, the playbook may involve retaliatory action first – to alarm American industries – followed by negotiations. This could mobilize US corporate lobbying power, forcing Washington to reconsider its position. If Trump’s real objective is simply to extract better access for US companies abroad, this classic approach may work.
But if his aim is different – such as provoking a controlled global economic crisis to eliminate the US trade deficit – then the situation becomes far more volatile. In this case, the tariffs will persist, and compromise will remain elusive.
Under such a scenario, international trade faces significant risks. Some forecasts estimate that global GDP could shrink by 0.3-0.5% due to the combination of US tariffs and retaliatory moves. Disrupted supply chains will intensify competition in third-country markets. US imports could fall by up to a third, stoking inflation and creating shortages for American consumers.
Paradoxically, the US could also experience a surge in domestic investment. One recent projection suggested up to $3 trillion could be redirected into the American economy. Trump’s approach may be an aggressive version of import substitution, with all the known advantages and drawbacks.
Russia, for now, is not directly affected by these tariff moves. Bilateral trade has already collapsed under the weight of sanctions, and no new US tariffs specifically target Russia. However, the secondary effects could be significant.
Global trade flows resemble a network of rivers. Trump’s tariff dam, compounded by retaliatory levees, will force goods to flood other markets – often at steep discounts. These displaced exports will depress prices and undermine local industries, including Russia’s. Falling demand for industrial inputs like oil, gas, and metals could hurt our economy.
Meanwhile, imports into Russia may rise. That might be fine if it’s limited to Harley-Davidsons or American whiskey, which face little domestic competition. But if cheaper foreign metals, chemicals, or automobiles flood in, the consequences for Russian manufacturers could be severe.
China, as the main target of US tariffs, may increase its exports to Russia. In theory, Beijing can regulate its export flows. We must engage with Chinese officials to develop a coordinated approach to prevent destabilizing surges.
Fortunately, Russia has the legal infrastructure to respond: we can raise tariffs, counter dumping, and retaliate against subsidized imports. But implementation is another matter. Decision-making in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is slow and often paralyzed by conflicting national interests. It currently takes a year to adjust tariffs and up to 18 months for safeguard measures. This system, built for a calmer world, needs urgent reform.
It’s also time for Russia to scrutinize the dozens of free trade zones we’ve signed. Trump has attacked NAFTA and other deals for hollowing out US industry. We should ask ourselves: who truly benefits from our trade preferences?
Every decision in trade policy has consequences. Trump’s tariff strategy offers a case study in how those consequences unfold.
This article was first published by Kommersant, and was translated and edited by the RT team.
